Title: “Paternalistic Persuasion”
Abstract: Paternalistic experts (“Advisors”) often seek to make decision-makers (“Choosers”) better off by persuading them to change their behavior. Choosers, however, are often reluctant to make certain behavioral changes. To successfully persuade a Chooser to change their behavior, an Advisor should therefore give the Chooser a recommendation that accounts for this reluctance. In a setting where Choosers are wary of recommenders’ incentives, I experimentally investigate whether Advisors send recommendations that account for this wariness, and why they may fail to do so. I find that up to 79% of Advisors send sub-optimal recommendations. Instead, up to two-thirds of Advisors send recommendations that would only be optimal if Choosers were not wary. I show, however, that prompting Advisors to think about Choosers’ likely response to a recommended change is an effective way to correct this mistake. Advisors’ initial mistake is thus consistent with a failure to focus on recommendations that Choosers are likely to accept.
Location: Max Gluskin House, Room 106
Date: October 9, 2024
Time: 12:10-13:30